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The 2010 Personal Firewall Robustness Evaluation 
 
Satnam Singh Bhamra 
School of Computer and Security Science 
Edith Cowan University  




With the advent of cheaper Internet connections, the number of Internet connections among home users is on the 
rise. Generally, home users have little understanding of the security concerns associated with Internet 
connectivity. To protect against computer attacks, generally a home user may install a personal firewall on 
his/her computer. To determine the effectiveness of personal firewalls, evaluation tests were performed against 
the ten firewall products available to users at local electronic stores and listed on popular firewall security 
websites. The firewalls were tested in their default and maximum security mode. The investigation was carried 
out by performing a port scan and vulnerability scan attacks against a computer with no firewall protection and 
computers running personal firewalls. The results of the investigation established that the computers running 
the firewalls exhibited some or all of the vulnerabilities detected on a computer with no firewall protection. 
 
Keywords 




The acceptance of the Internet comes at a cost. An Internet connection opens a gateway for an unauthorised 
public audience to exploit private information stored on private hosts. Private or Public corporations generally 
have the financial backing and expertise staff, to stay protected against these exploits. However, home users are 
typically computer security illiterate, and often are left vulnerable to computer attacks. There are countless 
public and private resources available to home users, to educate them on how to protect themselves on the 
Internet. Public examples of such a resource are two websites launched by the Australian Government, 
www.cybersmart.gov.au and www.staysmartonline.gov.au. These websites are designed to guide home users, on 
the security challenges of the Internet, and the precautions they can take against these challenges. The use of a 
personal or desktop firewall on computer connected to the Internet is recommended on these websites.  
 
Several firewall vendors over the past few years have started to develop free and/or affordable personal firewall 
applications for home users (Herzogl & Shahmehri, 2007; McDermott, 2000; McDougall, 2001). Operating 
systems developers such as Microsoft and Apple have also started to include a built-in personal firewall into 
their OS (NYU, 2006). A personal firewall is a software-based firewall security suite, designed for those with 
limited computer networking and security skills (Raja, Hawkey, Beznosov, & Booth, 2010), which is installed 
on a single computer, and provides security protection against threats for only that system (Whelan, 2006).  
 
Personal firewalls work by controlling and monitoring inbound and outbound connections on a computer based 
on a firewall policy, which may be pre or user defined (Cieslak, 2006). It can monitor and control not only 
network layer traffic, but also application layer traffic (Felman, 2004). In addition to these firewall features, 
many of the current personal firewalls also include anti-virus protection, malware protection, ad-filtering and 
email attachment filtering capabilities (Cieslak, 2006). 
 
A personal firewall can be used by home users as a security layer against security attacks. However, previous 
research has demonstrated that in various instances a personal firewall fails to protect a system from known 
security attacks (Herzogl & Shahmehri, 2007; Pydayya, Hannay, & Szewczyk, 2009; Szewczyk & Valli, 2006; 
Yee, 2002). This study builds upon the previous personal firewall research, by investigating the effectiveness of 




Personal firewalls in theory stealth a computer from network scan attacks. The objective of this study was to 
evaluate how personal firewalls respond to a (1) port scan and (2) vulnerability scan attacks.  
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The test environment comprised of two virtual machines (1) Windows 7 for housing the personal firewalls and 
(2) Backtrack 4 for running Nmap, Nessus 4.2.2 and OpenVAS 2.0.2 scanners. To select the firewall products to 
be tested, products those are available to the local consumers at local computer stores such as JB HI-FI, Dick 
Smith and Officeworks and the top-rated personal firewalls listed on “firewallguide.com”, were chosen for the 
study. The default and maximum security level for each firewall was investigated, and Table 1 lists the personal 
firewall products used in this research. 
 
Product Name Version 
Comodo Firewall 4.1.150349.920 
ESET Smart Security 4 4.2.40.0 
F-Secure Internet Security 2010 10.00 Build 246 
Kaspersky Internet Security 2010 9.0.0.736 
McAfee Internet Security 2011 11.5 
Norton Internet Security 2010 17.8.0.5 
Outpost Firewall Pro 7.0 3373.514.1234 
Trend Internet Security 2011 17.50.1647.0000 
Windows Firewall Windows 7 Home Premium Built-in Firewall 
ZoneAlarm Free Firewall 9.2.057.000 
 
Table 1 - Name of the Personal Firewall Products Tested 
To define a benchmark for evaluating the testing results, a Windows 7 machine with no firewall was tested, and 




Data collected in the testing stages, points to the fact, that machines loaded with the firewalls displayed some 
weaknesses. Some firewalls, to a certain extent, managed to shield the computer from the attacking probes. In 
this section, the findings of the Nmap, vulnerability scanning and other relevant data discovered as part of the 
research will be discussed. 
 
NMAP RESULTS DISCUSSION 
 
In theory personal firewalls stealth’s open ports, and protects and alerts against port scan attacks. Unfortunately, 
when this is put into practice, the results are undesirable. The baseline machine returned thirteen open ports. 
 
Default firewall security level findings: From the overview presented in Table 2, one can identify:  
1. Only two firewalls out of the ten tested, blocked the address of the Nmap attacker. These were ESET and 
Outpost firewalls. Outpost temporary blocked the attacker for 5 minutes, while ESET didn’t display the 
blockage time.  
2. Only three firewalls produced an alert upon the detection of the Nmap attack. The failure of other ten 
firewalls to alert, indicates a user may not be aware of an attack happening. 
3. Only six firewalls logged the Nmap attack. Of these six firewalls, ESET, F-Secure, McAfee and Kaspersky 
logged the attack as a type of port scan attack. Norton logged it as an intrusion attempt attack, without 
defining what the intrusion attempt was. Outpost logged the Nmap attack as a scan, without explaining the 
term scan. 
4. ESET firewall provided the best protection against the Nmap attack. ESET logged the Nmap scan, and 
temporarily blocked the attacker. This resulted in Nmap detecting no open ports, which indicates the 
likelihood of exploiting the machine via a port is significantly low. The only downside of the ESET firewall 
was it failed to produce an alert upon the detection of the Nmap attack. 
5. Outpost firewall offered the second best protection against the Nmap attack. Outpost logged and alerted on 
the scan, and also temporarily blocked the attacker. 
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6. The Nmap scan against Comodo and Windows Firewall machines returned similar results, and significantly 
fewer open ports than the baseline. The downsides of these firewalls were none of them alerted about the 
Nmap scan or blocked the attacker. By default logging is disabled on Windows Firewall. This means, 
Windows Firewall doesn’t keep a record of incoming and outgoing traffic. Comodo firewall has logging 
enabled, but it failed to log the attack or produce an alert and, also block the Nmap attacker. 
7. Norton firewall returned seven open ports. Norton firewall detected the Nmap attack, but didn’t produce an 
alert. F-Secure firewall returned ten open ports. F-Secure detected and produced an alert message for the 
Nmap attack.  
8. The Nmap scan against the machines running Trend Micro and ZoneAlarm firewalls returned similar results 
as the baseline. Both firewalls didn’t detect/log or alert on Nmap attack. This means the installation of 
Trend Micro and ZoneAlarm failed to protect the machine against the port scan attack. 
9. The machine running Kaspersky firewall returned more open ports than the baseline. This is because 
Kaspersky opened two extra ports, 1110 and 19780, for its operation. These extra ports may add weakness 
to the machine, as a hacker may try to exploit them, and this may not be the case on the baseline machine. 
Kaspersky firewall detected and alerted on the Nmap scan. The alert message had interesting information in 
it. The alert message indicated, Kaspersky has detected an attack, but the attacker address was not blocked, 
because it could be spoofed. 
Maximum firewall security level findings: From the overview presented in Table 3, one can identify: 
1. Windows Firewall doesn’t provide an option to increase the level of security. This means, it is limited to 
default security mode. 
2. The Nmap scan for the machines running McAfee, Comodo, Outpost, F-Secure, ESET and Norton firewall, 
returned no open ports. This is because, in the maximum firewall security mode, these firewalls block all 
uninitiated incoming traffic. 
3. Outpost and Kaspersky were the only firewalls to produce an alert upon the detection of the Nmap attack, 
and to log the attack. Outpost firewall temporarily blocked the Nmap attacker for 5 minutes. 
4. Only three of the ten firewalls running in the maximum state, returned open ports: 
i. The machine running ZoneAlarm firewall returned three open ports. In its default mode, ZoneAlarm 
didn’t detect or alert on the incoming Nmap attack, and the same applied when it was running in 
maximum security mode. 
ii. The machine running Kaspersky firewall returned eight open ports. Kaspersky detected an alert on the 
incoming Nmap attack. Kaspersky failed to block the attack, because according to the Kaspersky 
firewall, the source of the attack could be spoofed, so it would not be blocked. This was the same 
behaviour when Kaspersky was running in the default security mode. 
iii. The machine running Trend Micro firewall in its maximum security state returned more ports than its 
default security state. Nmap detected thirteen open ports, and one closed port. A closed port is a port 
which can send and receive packets, but there is no application/service attached to it. The port detected 
as closed was 554, the Windows media server port. This port was detected open, when Trend Micro 
was running in default mode. Nmap also detected a new port, which was detected by Nmap when 
Trend Micro was running in default mode. The new port detected was 5357, the Microsoft network 
discovery port. In its default mode, Trend Micro didn’t detect or alert on the incoming Nmap attack, 
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VULNERABILITY RESULT DISCUSSION 
 
The goal of the vulnerability scan was finding out if the personal firewalls are able to hide software 
vulnerabilities for Windows 7. Two different vulnerability scanners were used: 
 
1. OpenVAS: An open source vulnerability scanner. 
2. Nessus: The free version of Nessus. 
 
Nessus Results Discussion 
 
Nessus scanner organises detected vulnerabilities into four different risk categories: low, medium, high and 
critical. The Nessus scanner only detected low severity vulnerabilities on the baseline and machines running the 
personal firewalls. The Nessus scan of the baseline machine returned twenty-five vulnerabilities. 
 
Default firewall security level findings: From the overview presented in Table 4, one can identify: 
 
1. Only Outpost and ESET firewalls managed to block the source of the Nessus scan. 
2. Only Outpost and Kaspersky firewalls produced an alert upon the detection of the Nessus scan. The 
failure of other ten firewalls to alert indicates a user may not be aware of a vulnerability scan 
happening against his/her computer. 
3. Only five firewalls logged the Nessus scan. Of these five firewalls, McAfee and ESET detected it as a 
port scan attack, and Kaspersky detected it as a network attack scan. Norton detected it as an intrusion 
attempt, without defining what the intrusion was. Outpost detected it as a MOYARI13 attack. Outpost 
doesn’t provide any help in its log window to explain what a MOYARI13 attack is. 
4. Only one firewall out of the ten tested, completely protected the computer from the Nessus scan. This 
was the Norton firewall. This indicates the likelihood of exploiting a known vulnerability is 
significantly low on the machine running the Norton firewall. Norton detected and logged the Nessus 
scan, but failed to produce an alert.  
5. The machine running ZoneAlarm firewall returned similar results as the baseline. ZoneAlarm firewall 
failed to detect, log and block the Nessus scan. 
6. The machine running ESET firewall returned sixteen vulnerabilities. ESET detected the scan, but failed 
to log it.  
7. The machine running Trend Micro firewall returned one less vulnerability than the baseline. The 
vulnerability missing was the plugin ID 10114, which is for the ICMP Timestamp Request Remote 
Data Disclosure. Trend Micro failed to detect, log and block the Nessus scan. 
8. The machine running Kaspersky firewall returned an additional vulnerability than the baseline. This is 
because of the Kaspersky custom port 1110. Kaspersky detects and logs the Nessus scan. It failed to 
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Maximum firewall security level findings: From the overview presented in Table 5, one can identify: 
 
1. Only Outpost and ESET firewalls temporarily blocked the Nessus attacker. 
2. Only Outpost, Kaspersky and ESET detected and logged the Nessus scan. Outpost and Kaspersky 
produced an alert upon the detection of the Nessus scan. ESET and Kaspersky logged the Nessus scan 
with the same name the firewalls did under their default mode. On the other hand, Outpost logged the 
Nessus scan with a different name from its default mode. Outpost logged it as a scan attack. 
3. Only the machines running McAfee, Comodo and ZoneAlarm returned no vulnerabilities. 
4. Trend Micro and ESET returned similar results to their default state. This would indicate, increasing 
the level of firewall protection, made no difference in hiding the system’s vulnerabilities. 
5. The machines running Norton, Outpost and F-Secure firewalls returned a single vulnerability, and that 
was plugin id 25220. This plugin is used to identify the network card brand. 
OpenVAS Results Discussion 
 
OpenVAS scanner organises detected vulnerabilities into four different risk categories: security notes, security 
warnings, and security holes and critical. The OpenVAS scanner only detected security notes and warnings 
vulnerabilities on the baseline machine. The OpenVAS scan of the baseline machine returned seventeen security 
notes and three security warnings vulnerabilities. 
 
Default firewall security level findings: From the overview presented in Table 6, one can identify: 
 
1. Only Outpost and ESET firewalls managed to block the source of the OpenVAS scan. 
2. Only Outpost and Kaspersky firewalls produced an alert upon the detection of the OpenVAS scan. 
3. Only five firewalls logged the OpenVAS scan. ESET and McAfee logged it as a port scan attack and 
Kaspersky logged it as a network attack scan. Outpost logged it as a scan and Norton as an intrusion 
attempt. 
4. The machine running Kaspersky returned more vulnerabilities than the baseline. It returned one extra 
security notes vulnerability which OpenVAS defined as certain scripts failed to complete in a defined 
timeout. According to OpenVAS report page, the firewall running on the system, may have detected 
the scan and blocked the scripts. There was no mention of the scripts that failed to run. The machine 
running Kaspersky also returned a security hole, which the baseline and machines running the other 
firewalls did not. This security hole had a CVE ID of CVE-2009-3103. This security hole was for the 
remote code-execution vulnerability in the protocol header for the Server Message Block (SMB) 
Negotiate Protocol Request. 
5. Norton and ESET firewalls provided the best protection against the OpenVAS scan. The OpenVAS 
results for machines running these firewalls returned only two security notes vulnerabilities.  
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Maximum firewall security level findings: From the overview presented in Table 7, one can identify: 
 
1. Only Outpost, Kaspersky and ESET detected and logged the OpenVAS scan. Outpost and Kaspersky 
produced an alert upon the detection of the OpenVAS scan.  
2. Only Outpost and ESET temporarily blocked the OpenVAS attacker. Kaspersky failed to block the 
attacker, for the reason given for the Nmap and Nessus scan in the previous sections. 
3. Comodo, ESET, F-Secure, Kaspersky, McAfee, Norton, Outpost and ZoneAlarm returned similar 
results. For machines running these firewalls, OpenVAS returned only two security notes: OS 
fingerprints result and Traceroute information. 
4. The machine running Trend Micro returned similar results to its default state. This would indicate, 




This research demonstrated that machines running personal firewalls displayed weaknesses, when exposed to 
the security attacks. A machine with no firewall protection was tested, so that its results could be used as a 
baseline to compare results for the firewalls.  
 
In some instances, an installation of firewall returned similar or more weaknesses than the baseline. The 
Kaspersky firewall was one such example, which returned more open ports and vulnerabilities than the baseline 
machine. In other cases, personal firewalls often provide an option to increase its level of security protection. 
This would indicate, if a home user were to increase the security level to the maximum, the personal firewall 
would offer better protections than its default state. The Trend Micro firewall failed this notion, as it returned 
similar results in both default and maximum state.  
 
Vendor websites list alerting, logging and blocking of attacks as the key advantages of a personal firewall. 
Norton and Kaspersky firewalls were the only firewalls to log the conducted attacks, and Outpost and ESET 
firewalls to block the source of the attacks. F-Secure, Windows Firewall, Comodo, Trend Micro and ZoneAlarm 
firewalls failed to log the attacks. 
 
The literature reviewed, displayed examples of similar discoveries made by researchers on previous versions of 
personal firewalls. This trend raises questions, on the standard of testing these products undergo, before being 
made public. If we were to look at the sale of electrical equipment in Australia, such equipment has to pass 
safety requirements set by standards such as the AS/NZZ 60950.1, before being sold to consumers. This assures 
consumers that the products are safe to install, operate and maintain. However, there is no standard or model to 
test the validity of a personal firewall product, before being made public. Therefore, a home user may not be 
aware of the weaknesses displayed by personal firewalls, and may assume by installing a personal firewall on 
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